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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
COLUMBIA IRON MINING COMPANY, ^
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
—• vs. —
IRON COUNTY,
Defendant and Respondent,

Case No.
7503

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Intervener and Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I.
Respondent Incorrectly States the Facts.
While at page 2 of their brief respondents begrudgingly concede plaintiff has correctly stated the basic
facts in this cause, they then in argument depart therefrom.
a. Time and again it is stated or inferred (e.g., pp.
28, 30, 37, 39, 71, 76) that plaintiff emasculated or
1
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amended Exhibit 1, the tenn requirement contract for
the sale of ores between Columbia and the United States
covering the Geneva Plant, in an effort to obtain an
unjust or manipulated tax advantage.
The fact is that Exhibit 1 was in no respect amended
or changed one iota. (R. 94) What happened was that
in accordance with the contract provisions and just as
it could have done with the contract still held by the
United States or any other person, Columbia exercised
its optional right to buy up certain equipment instead
of to continue to pay rent; and Columbia finally paid off
in full the advances owing by it to the Government.
Both of these options were exercised by Columbia prior
to the assignment of Exhibit 1 to Geneva. In neither
instance was the terms of Exhibit 1 pertaining to the
sale of iron ores changed or affected. Respondents
repeatedly in argument (e.g. p. 36) ignore the law which
provides that the net, not gross income, from the extraction of ores is the measure of the mine's value.
So the basic issue remains: when Geneva happened
to acquire the Government's buying end of Exhibit 1,
could the Tax Commission by reason of that single fact
then proceed to ignore the contract prices for the ores
in fixing the value of the Columbia mine? Or did not
the legislative mandate for assessing values on the basis
of money or its equivalent actually realized from the
sale of ores by the owner-operator control, at least until
the amendment of 1949 ?
b. It would seem that the respondents seek to
confuse rather than clarify for the court the issue pre2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sented here when they argue (Brief p. 25) that the United
States Steel Corporation and the Government agreed
that Exhibit 1 was to result in no profit, and therefore,
presumably there would be no value and Iron County
would suffer or even be defrauded of tax revenues.
The record and fact is that the no-profit agreement
was confined to Columbia Steel Company's construction and Geneva Steel Company's operation of the Geneva Plant for the Government (R. 91), In decided contrast the sale of the iron ores was negotiated at arm's
length for a price which over the 18-year estimated life
of Geneva would bring to Columbia as the mine owner
a very generous profit, resulting in substantial and
reasonable returns for the ore sold and therefore mine
values which Iron County could and does tax.
c. Finally, respondents seek to torture a stipulation which Columbia made in the interest of a speedy
court determination of the single concise question of
law, into a theory for sustaining the decision below on
a basis which neither the Tax Commission, Judge Hoyt
nor plaintiff intended.
It is argued (Brief pp. 33-8) that since the terms of
Exhibit 1 did not apply to Ironton, the Tax Commission could legally set the values of ore furnished to that
plant; and therefore plaintiff has stipulated itself out
of court. But respondents know that the stipulation was
intended to avoid factual questions of value, so that when
the sole legal question was determined, the case could
be readily resolved without further delay. (R. 69) And
3
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that single legal question was and is whether or not,
prior to the 1949 amendment, the Tax Commission in
the case of a bona fide, arms-length contract executed
between nonaffiliated interests to provide for a reasonable sales price had authority to vary the legislative
mandate requiring use of a multiple of the mine's actual
income in determining, for tax assessment purposes,
mine values, solely because the buying end of the term
requirement sales contract happened to be acquired subsequent to execution by another subsidiary of the parent
of the corporate mine owner.
It is submitted that plaintiff's position as to this
will be obvious to those who read the rather simple record
in this case. But should the court turn the result on
the difference between the Ironton and Geneva plants,
both supplied by Columbia, it is respectfully requested
that the case be remanded for proof as to the actual
facts pertaining to the I ronton ore supply.

II.
The Issue Here Should Not Be Confused.
After reading respondent's 100-page brief, plaintiff wonders if we are talking about the same case with
its intended single issue of law.
When Geneva Steel Company acquired the Geneva
Plant from the United States (as Kaiser-Frazer did the
Ironton No. 2 Plant) this concise question arose in
ascertaining plaintiff's ad valorem property tax: whether

4
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the contract prices set by Exhibit 1 should continue to
be followed, as they have been without question during
the years of Government ownership and operation. This
question was pTesented to counsel for Columbia and
the State Tax Commission. The facts were simple, and
not in dispute in any way because even as to the issue
of the then market value of the ores produced, plaintiff
for the purposes of this case agreed not to place in issue
the amounts claimed by the Tax Commission staff. (R.
69).
Section 80-5-57 stated in unequivocal and clear terms
that the basis for tax purposes should be " t h e gross proceeds realized * * * from the sale or conversion into
money or its equivalent of all ores from such mine * * *",
less costs to determine net proceeds. The Haynes case,
with which we were of course familiar, had come down
construing this langauge broadly to include federal subsidies received by the mine owner-operator as bonuses
and thus for practical purposes " r e a l i z e d " as a part
of the proceeds from the ore production by the various
Utah mine owners or operators. No such additional
proceeds were here " r e a l i z e d " by plaintiff.
In direct contrast to income and other tax statutes,
it was noted that the Tax Commission was then given
no legislative grant of power to set aside contract prices
between corporate affiliates when the contract returns
were improvident or not yielding actual or theoretical
maximum returns. Bather the Commission had denied
that it had such power in its official reports to the Legislature and the Governor.
5
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Not only was there no evidence of any intent to
defraud; the facts indicated only the happenstance that
the two ends of the basic sales contract with the sale of
Geneva happened now to be owned by subsidiaries of an
admittedly common parent corporation. There was no
question but that the contract was originally negotiated
at arm's length between unaffiliated interests and
yielded substantial and reasonable returns to the mine
owner. The terms of that contract had in no way been
amended or changed.
Under these facts and faced with this unambiguous
and clear statute, Columbia was advised that the proceeds actually received by it under its bona fide contract were still the measure prescribed by Utah's legislature for determining the value of the mine for tax purposes. Counsel for the Tax Commission conceded this
position in the companion occupation tax case. But counsel for Iron County, to save what they might for their
client, have very diligently presented the following array
of possible defenses and arguments.
a. The simple issue of law was confused and almost
buried, as heretofore discussed.
b. It was claimed that this action should have been
brought against the County Treasurer rather than Iron
County—an issue likewise quickly dropped. (K. 18).
c. It is claimed that Section 4, Article XIII of
Utah's Constitution, and Section 80-5-57 do not mean
what they say, and that the Tax Commission in its discretion can, in instances involving a bona fide contract
6
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negotiated at arm's length and resulting in substantial
and reasonable return to the mine owner, determine its
own mine values independent of legislative control.
(Brief pp. 3-23). But when this argument of administrative arrogance is over, Section 4 of the Constitution still
says that the Tax Commission shall assess mines " a s the
legislature shall p r o v i d e " ; Section 80-5-56 still says that
the Tax Commission shall assess mines " a t a value equal
to two times the average net annual proceeds thereof";
and Section 80-5-57 still defines not only " n e t proceeds,"
but " g r o s s proceeds" to be what the mine owner, operator, lessee or equivalent has realized "from the sale or
conversion into money or its equivalent, of all ores from
such mine."
d. It is claimed that United States Steel Corporation—a holding corporation never qualified to do or
doing business in the State of Utah—is "operating the
p r o p e r t y " within the meaning of Section 80-5-57 (e.g.
Brief p. 3). But under elementary concepts familiar to
anyone acquainted with common legal principles it is
plain that Columbia, as owner, was here the operator—
an entirely different legal person than United States
Steel Corporation.
The courts have but recently rejected an equally
sweeping claim to substitute the railroads for the Pacific
Fruit Express Company in such cases as Gaulden vs.
Southern Pacific Company, 174 F . 2d 1022, and Moleton
v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, decided by this court
219 P. 2d 1081.
e.

Contrary to the facts, it is suggested that the
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whole cavalcade of events pertaining to the Geneva Steel
Plant was one carefully conceived plan to the end that
Iron County would be deprived of tax revenues. The
record just does not support any such suggestion.
/. Advantage would be taken of perhaps loosely
worded but certainly clearly understood stipulations to
win a temporary victory by evading the basic issue of
law here presented, concerning which we have heretofore commented. The Ironton ores are in fact a relatively small portion of those sold by Columbia,
g. It is said that the official report of the Tax Commission to the Governor and Legislature was a mistake,
(p. 78); as was also the Commission's dismissal in this
court of the companion occupation tax case.
h. I t is incorrectly stated that Exhibit 1, the key
contract, was a non-profit venture; or in any event was
subsequently emasculated to become so, concerning which
we have heretofore commented and the facts pertaining
to which speak for themselves.
i. The 1949 legislature action is passed off as of
no persuasive weight, (p. 81).
j . The straw man argument is constantly raised
(e.g., Brief p. 71 )that the Commission is not "bound
by sales prices a l o n e " ; of course the Commission may
also include the proceeds realized from '' conversion into
money or its equivalent by the mine's owner-operator."
A:. Finally, there are cited and quoted at great
length numerous decisions with which we do not dis8
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agree, but which are just not applicable to the facts here
as they are. These cases involve facts consistent with
respondent's incorrect opening statement that the question here is whether a parent corporation through subsidiaries can itself determine in effect the value of its
mining property for tax purposes, (p. 1).
Plaintiff again invites the court's attention to the
true issue here—in no sense the sweeping one which
respondents continually suggest: Does the one incidental
fact that when Geneva acquired the buying end of Exhibit
1 Geneva was affiliated corporation-wise with the seller,
thereby imply into Utah's unambiguous statute a power
on the part of the State Tax Commission to substitute
its concept of market values for the prices under this
bona fide contract which had been established after arm's
length bargaining by wholly unrelated interests, v/hieh
had also been accepted by the Commission for purposes
of the tax for the years 1943 to 1947, and which remained
unchanged after the sale?
The legislature didn't delegate that power to the
Commission until 1949 at the instance of Representative
Lyman of Iron County (H.B. 179).
From 1937 until then the legislature had refused
to change the clear mandate of Section 80-5-57 that the
contract prices were controlling although the possibility
of "rigging" by affiliated interests—a possibility not
here involved—was called officially and specifically to
its attention with a request by the Commisson for a
grant of that power.
9
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In 1949 such a power was delegated, but limited to
cases where " t h e gross proceeds realized (obviously
by the mine owner-operator, and not United States Steel)
from the ore is disproportionate to its reasonable fair
cash value.' 7
So if such a power existed prior to Chapter 79 enacted in 1949, this court must read it into the law, together with its limitations; this court must tell the Tax
Commission it was wrong in its 1937 report; and this
court presumably must apply retroactively the words
"reasonable fair cash value," first amended into all of
Utah's ad valorem tax statutes in 1947 following the
report and recommendations of the Legislative Tax
Study Committee.
This court must effect either this judicial legislation
for the benefit of Iron County, or reiterate the fundamental holding that respondents cannot here arrogate
unto themselves the legislative power to amend retroactively Section 80-5-57.

III.
Inter-Company Charges May Be Controlling,
Beginning at the bottom of page 39 respondents
argue "inter-company charges between wholly-owned
subsidiaries are never controlling on taxing authorities.''
But before entering into an extended 30-page argument
on the point, two side contentions are interjected at
page 40 to which we here reply.
10
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First, it is stated that appellant must show that the
Commission's assessment is arbitrary or fraudulent.
Of course relief is also to be granted if the taxing authority has failed or refused to follow the law—here as prescribed by Section 80-5-57. Continental National Bank
v. Nuylor, 179 P. 67, 54 Utah 49; Fox v. Groesbeck, 226
P. 183, 63 Utah 401.
Secondly, respondents repeat their claim that the
tax basis urged by plaintiff is " u n f a i r , " " u n j u s t , " and
a "discrimination." (p. 41). Of course what Utah's Constitution and legislature require is an assessment of mine
values based upon annual net, not gross, income. The
fallacy of respondents' point would seem clear when it is
realized that under this system of mine valuation an
owner can shut down for whatever reason is the cause
thereof; and hence there would be no income and no tax
value. A current example is the Silver King Mine. The
lack or diminution of net income and hence tax values
may result from a variety of causes—high labor costs,
low metal prices, poor management, mere whim, disaster,
etc. But respondents could no more claim such tax results unjust, than in this case can they set aside the
Constitution and statutes and impose their concept of
values merely because more revenue might result.
Turning now at last to the respondent's claim that
inter-company charges of affiliates are never binding
(we assume the contention that only one " p e r s o n " —
United States Steel Corporation—was here involved,
will no longer confuse this issue), we examine Exhibit
1. Unchanged, it is still the bona fide contract first
11
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negotiated at arm's length between Columbia and the
Government, but the purchasing end of Exhibit 1 is now
owned by another legal person—Geneva Steel Company.
The same basic situation might result if no corporations
were here involved. Exhibit 1 might have been negotiated
at arm's length between mine owner John Doe and
buyer Richard Roe—total strangers; and then the Roe
buying end, while the contract was still extant, might
have been acquired by John Doe's wife, whom we will
assume was a suppliant tool or alter-ego of her husband's
in business affairs.
Now we in no way countenance the fraud which
would be perpetrated upon Iron County if Mr. and Mrs.
Doe, or Columbia and Geneva, had initially or by subsequent amendment contracted to sell Doe's ore for 50c
per ton when the actual market value was $1.00. Respondents ' cases amply support that position, and courts
will not perpetuate such frauds by granting relief even if
as here the legislature had not granted the tax authority
the power to set aside such contracts.
But this is not the factual situation here. The concise question is if it is fraudulent, and hence relief is to
be denied, for Columbia in this case, or for Mr. Doe,
to continue to rely on the contract terms, valid when
negotiated with the Government or Roe, now that Geneva
here, or Mrs. Doe, has become the second contracting
party.
Exhibit 1 is not a renewable contract in the sense
that affirmative action is required by either party to
12
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extend it from year to year. It is a term requirement
agreement for an 18-year period, with a sales price for
the iron ores resulting in a substantial net income to the
mine owner which was in no sense " o u t of l i n e " at the
time the price was negotiated at arm's length by the
unaffiliated interests. A similar contract was likewise
negotiated covering Ironton No. 2, which is now held
by the Kaiser interests, which are wholly unrelated to
Columbia.
Certainly while the buying ends of these contracts
were outstanding in the United States or Kaiser-Frazer,
there would be no fraud to defeat recovery even though
we assume at any particular current period of the term
the market prices for iron ore should vary from the contract prices. The value of the mine is directly influenced
by the returns as provided by these bona fide and reasonable contracts.
It could hardly be urged that Iron County could refuse to follow the Constitution and statutes, and that the
courts should deny relief, if car owner " X " had unfortunately destroyed his new car or sold it to an Idaho
buyer resulting in a loss of Iron County tax values,
solely on the theory that thereby Iron County would
be deprived \of taxes. Yet that in essence seems to be the
County's complaint here.
Such cases as respondents cite involve active manipulation on the part of the taxpayer entirely absent here.
For example, the Tuscon Gas case quoted at page 44
states that the test of the questioned transactions was
IS
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" w h a t they would reasonably have been between truly
independent entities acting at arm's length.'' This is
the very test we are readily willing to invoke here,
namely, the contract terms negotiated between Columbia
and the United States of America.
Higgins v. Smith, Griffiths v. Helvefing, and the
array of authorities relied upon by respondents all have
two elements lacking here: (1) active steps by the taxpayer to effectuate the tax advantage, even though in
some cases actual intent to evade taxes was absent; and
(2) statutory authority for the tax administrator to
scrutinize the transaction and invoke substance rather
than form. Here the essential fault of plaintiff asserted
by respondents, is failure to take affirmative action to
amend the contract in order to increase its tax burden;
and of course the statutory power is missing. Incidentally, these cases unanimously refute respondents'
contention that inter-corporate contracts are per se
fraudulent and void, (e.g., Palmolive, p. 60.)
Attention on this point is invited to the 1942 unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court,
which is the key authority, in Moline Properties, Inc.,
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 319 U. S. 436, 87
L. ed. 1499:
" T h e doctrine of corporate entity fills a
useful purpose in business life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of
the state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply
with the demands of creditors or to serve the
creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, so
long as that purpose is the equivalent of business
14
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activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains
a separate taxable entity. * * * "
However:
u* * * j n g e n e r a i ? j n matters relating to the
revenue, the corporate form may be disregarded
where it is a sham or tmreal. In such situations
the form is a bald and mischievous fiction. Higgins v. Smith, 308 IT. S. 473, 477, 478, 84 L ed.
406, 410-412, 60 S. Ct. 355; Gregory v. Helvering,
293 IT. S. 465, 79 L ed. 596, 55 S. Ct, 266, 97 A L E
1355." (Italics are ours.)
No doubt it was knowledge of just this basic distinction, all so clearly elucidated in such cases as National
Investor's Corporation v. Hoey, 144 F . 2d 466 and Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F . 2d 334, that caused counsel
for respondents to insert in the Findings the following
over plaintiff's objection (E. 83, 85):
a. The word "nominally" in the tenth line of Finding VI (E, 92).
b. The last sentence of the first paragraph of said
Finding VI (E. 93) reading as follows:
" E a c h of such contracts was made, in fact,
under the full control of United States Steel, and
the operations thereunder were by it, operating
through its respective subsidiary, as named in
each (contract)."
c. The words " i n the name of" in the fifth line of
paragraph 2 of Finding V I I (E, 93).
d.

The last paragraph of said Finding V I I (E. 94).
15
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Plaintiff has never denied the corporate realities of
the fact that the parent of wholly-owned subsidiaries
has at least the potential power to exert "full control"
over the operations of its subsidiaries; and that in such
sense the parent may be the " o p e r a t o r , ' ' although '' nomin a l l y " the operations are conducted " i n the name of"
the subsidiaries. Consequently we did not object too
strenuously to Judge Hoyt's action in permitting respondents to insert these words in the court's findings;
nor did we originally assign error in this respect.
We were willing to let the record speak for itself—
that for years prior to this transaction each of the corporate entities here involved conducted its own legitimate business activities—Columbia by owning and operating its iron mines and making sales to various customers ; Columbia Steel by manufacturing pig iron at Ironton No. 2, and then in the war years constructing Geneva
for the Government; Geneva by taking over the iron and
steel producing operations in Utah, first for the Government and later on in its own behalf; with United
States Steel Corporation the corporate parent owning
the stock of these as well as its other operating subsidiaries over the United States. We feel it was in this
sense and with these facts well in mind that Judge Hoyt
made his decisions below.
Not until respondents filed their brief herein did
it materialize that in an attempt to sustain the court
below on any arguable thesis, the whole Steel Company's
corporate relationships would be claimed " s h a m or
u n r e a l " and thus subject to the alternative rule of the
16
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Higgins v. Smith and Gregory v. Helvering cases cited
above. Thus the importance to respondents of their use
in the findings of such words as "nominally" and " i n
the name of.''

IV.
Assignment of Error.
On page 2 of their brief respondents say: " W e will
assume that the court's findings of fact are supported
and accepted." To the extent that respondents have attempted to distort the facts as fairly disclosed by the
evidence in the record, plaintiff rejects respondents'
contention as to the meaning of these findings; and assigns as error the inclusion of the foregoing wording in
the finding below insofar as those words are intended to
support respondents' claim that the corporate situation
was here '' sham or unreal,'' rather than filling '' a useful purpose in business life."
But we hope that this court is not fooled and no
action is needed with respect to this assignment of error;
and that the words "nominally," " i n the name of,"
'' operations thereunder were by it,'' etc., will be given
their normal and undistorted meaning as supported by
the undisputed evidence. Here in just the same sense did
the United States of America construct and " o p e r a t e "
Geneva and Ironton No. 2 plants " i n the name of" Defense Plant Corporation, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, War Assets Administration, etc. But respondents have had no self-serving motive to claim that those
17
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corporate entities were " s h a m or unreal," when there,
too,'' a useful purpose in business life was filled.''
And again, a reading of these key cases as well as
those endlessly cited by respondents, will readily reveal
under which alternative of the Moline case the present
fact situation falls.
As to taxpayer's claim being'' inequitable,'' it strikes
us that the very reverse is true. It would seem inequitable for the County to be permitted to avoid bona fide
and reasonable contract terms establishing values, merely
because fortuitously the Geneva Plant was acquired by a
corporate affiliate of the mine owner, when the same contract while outstanding in the hands of the Government
or if assigned to Kaiser or other independent interests
would continue to be binding. Such a distinction as respondents claim would appear to place a premium upon
concealment of affiliations which plaintiff has readily
admitted. And should market prices fall, and ore be
worth half per ton on the market for any particular
period of the term as against the contract price, no doubt
the County would be the first then to complain of active
fraud and collusion if Columbia and Geneva should join
in a tax-conscious amendment of the contract to scale
down the term requirement prices.
So far as we can determine, we know of no other case
reported involving the peculiar factual situation here.
The legal principles applicable had the facts been otherwise, have never here been in dispute. Had there been
statutory authority prior to 1949 granted by the legis18
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lature to the Commission to vary the contract prices,
there would never have been this case. Had Columbia
taken any active steps after the sale to Geneva to vary
or rig or manipulate the fixed term requirement contract,
this case would not be here now. Likewise, if there was
any doubt as to the contract's being in good faith and
resulting from arm's length negotiations between unaffiliated interests. Here, to reiterate respondents' quotation of Mr. Justice Wolfe at page 72, was indeed " a
nonfictitious sale made on a free and open market."

Conclusion
Thus, in conclusion we respectfully submit that this
court (1) should not judicially legislate insofar as the
Commission's powers are concerned; and (2) should not,
under the limited factual situation of this case, deny
plaintiff relief where the Tax Commission has willfully
and arbitrarily refused to follow the legislative mandate
of the State of Utah.

C.C. PARSONS,
WM. M. McCBEA,
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. B E H L E ,
Attorneys

for

Appellant.
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